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Case Comment
Robinson-Patman Act: "In Commerce"
Jurisdictional Requirement Broadened
Plaintiff, an operator of an independent gas station, brought
suit for damages under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act, alleging that defendant oil companies sold gasoline to their
service stations located near plaintiff's station at lower prices
than those charged other stations in the state. In addition,
plaintiff alleged that defendants supported the intrastate pricecutting with profits derived from their interstate operations.
The trial court granted summary judgment against plaintiff for
failure to allege an interstate sale of a discriminatory nature as
required for Robinson-Patman subject matter jurisdiction. The
Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that a complaint in a suit for
damages under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act need
not allege such an interstate sale if it alleges instead that interstate operations were used to "underwrite" discriminatory intrastate sales. Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225 (5th Cir.
1972).
Price discrimination occurs when a seller offers to sell the
same commodities to different buyers at different prices. Such
discrimination may be injurious to either primary-line competition (competition among sellers) or secondary-line competition
(competition among buyers). Primary-line injury, for example,
may occur when price discrimination is initiated by a seller such
that lower prices are offered to potential buyers of a competing
seller than are offered to non-potential buyers of such a competitor. By contrast, secondary-line injury may occur when a
buyer can influence sellers through his market position to receive more favorable prices than competing buyers.
The Robinson-Patman Act' was enacted in 1936 to prohibit
any seller, subject to certain defenses,2 from engaging in price
discrimination. Originally the Act was principally directed
toward secondary-line injury; at the same time, however, it
1. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-b, 21a (1970).
2. Section 2 provides three defenses: (1) meeting competition,
(2) cost justification, and (3) changing conditions. F. RowE Prace
DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PAAAN AcT § 3.2, at 37-38
(1962).
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amended the Clayton Act and retained intact the latters proscription of price discrimination that adversely affects primaryline competition. 3 The jurisdictional requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act are contained in section 2(a) 4 and include at
least four distinct elements: (1) sales (2) of commodities (3) of
like grade and quality (4) in commerce. 5
The Clayton Act's general definition of "commerce" as
"trade or commerce among the several States and with foreign
nations" applies to the Robinson-Patman amendments." However, the "in commerce" jurisdictional requirement of the Robinson-Patman Act differs from that of the Sherman Act. The
commerce coverage of the latter is coextensive with the federal
3. [Section 2(a)] when originally enacted as part of the
Clayton Act in 1914, was born of a desire by Congress to curb
the use by financially powerful corporations of localized pricecutting tactics which had gravely impaired the competitive
position of other sellers.

It is, of course, quite true .

.

. that

the 1936 Robinson-Patman amendments to the Clayton Act
were motivated principally by congressional concern over the
impact upon secondary-line competition of the burgeoning of
mammoth purchasers, notably chain stores. However, the legislative history of these amendments leaves no doubt that
Congress was intent upon strengthening the Clayton Act provisions, not weakening them, and that it was no part of
Congress' purpose to curtail the pre-existing applicability of
§ 2(a) to price discriminations affecting primary-line competition.
FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1960) (footnotes
omitted).
4. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly,
to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce,
where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or
resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the
District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place
under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination, or with customers of either of them ....
5. F. RowE, supra note 2, § 3.1, at 36.
6. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970). According to the
Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee concerning the RobinsonPatman bill,
the special definitions of section 1 of the Clayton Act will apply without repetition to the terms concerned where they appear in this bill, since it is designed to become by amendment
a part of that act. Thus the term "commerce," as used herein,
becomes by force of those definitions interstate and foreign
commerce of the United States and commerce in and between
its various possessions.
S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936).
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commerce itself7 as defined in terms of the "affectation" doctrine8 Robinson-Patman, on the other hand, contains its own
"commerce" test, literally reaching only those price discriminations "where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce."
An allegation of a discriminatory sale in commerce necessarily involves a comparison between at least two separate transactions involving the same commodities at different prices. The
commerce test of the Robinson-Patman Act requires that at
least one of the two transactions cross a state line. 10 Under this
"one interstate sale" rule, however, it is immaterial which of the
two transactions, the higher-priced or the lower-priced, occurs
in interstate commerce.11
In Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 12 the Supreme Court in-

timated a possible exception to the "one interstate sale" rule under the Robinson-Patman Act's commerce test in cases of primary-line discrimination. Plaintiff in Moore was a local baker
7. See, e.g., United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S.
293, 298 (1945).
8. The Supreme Court developed the "affectation" doctrine in
the Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914), which held that the
federal commerce power extends to all activities, intrastate as well as
interstate, if a substantial effect on interstate commerce results. For
an historical analysis of the expansion of the interstate commerce concept, see Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,
334 U.S. 219, 229-35 (1948).
9. 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
The cases recognize a distinction between the commerce
which is covered by the Sherman Act and that covered by the
Robinson-Patman Act. "In an action brought under the Robinson-Patman Act it is necessary to allege and prove that the
transactions complained of are actually in interstate commerce,
while in actions brought under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
it is sufficient if the transactions complained of are shown to
have affected interstate commerce."
Willard Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 309 F.2d 943, 946
(6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963), quoting from Lewis
v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F. Supp. 547, 549 (N.D. Ill. 1943). This distinction
is supported by the legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act
since the Senate-House Conference Committee deleted a clause in the
House bill which would have adopted the "effect on commerce" criterion of the Sherman Act. HMR. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1936).
10. F. RowE, supra note 2, § 4.9, at 79.
11. Id. In determining the existence of an interstate sale, the
Supreme Court has applied a "flow of commerce" theory, making the
Act applicable even where commodities are shipped interstate but
temporarily stored in local warehouses or other facilities before being
redistributed within the state to local dealers. Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 238 (1951).
12. 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
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doing business solely in Santa Rosa, New Mexico. Defendant,
also in the bakery business, sold products in Santa Rosa as well
as in Texas. Defendant cut prices in Santa Rosa while maintaining prices elsewhere in New Mexico and in Texas, eventually forcing plaintiff out of business. The Court affirmed judgment for the plaintiff, noting that the defendant was "engaged
in commerce, selling bread both locally and interstate. In the
course of such business, it made price discriminations, maintaining the price in the interstate transactions and cutting the price
in the intrastate sales."'13 The Court found in addition, however, that defendant, as part of a system of interlocking corporations, was an interstate firm which had adversely affected
primary-line competition simply by engaging in purely local or
intrastate price-cutting. The Court further determined that
such intrastate price-cutting satisfied Robinson-Patman subjectmatter jurisdiction because "[t] he profits made in interstate activities would underwrite the losses of local price-cutting campaigns.' 1 4 This method of competition, then, is inherently pernicious because interstate businesses would destroy local businesses not by virtue of greater skill or efficiency but simply
through their financial capacity, derived from interstate operations, to wage local price wars." The Court found support for its
position that Robinson-Patman prohibits "the use of interstate
business to destroy local business" in the following congressional
statement:
[A] manufacturer . . . may not use the privilege of interstate commerce to the injury of his local trade, nor may he favor
his local trade to the injury of his interstate trade. The Federal
power to regulate interstate commerce is the power both to
limit its employment to the injury of business within the State,
commerce itself from injury by influand to protect interstate
ences within the State.1 6
The broad language of Moore is susceptible of two widely
divergent interpretations. On the one hand, the decision can be
restricted to the fact that one of the discriminatory sales actually did occur in interstate commerce such that the case is
consistent with the traditional "one interstate sale" rule. On
the other hand, Moore can be construed broadly to hold that,
with respect to primary-line injury, purely local discriminatory
sales by a seller engaged in interstate commerce satisfy the Act's
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 118 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 119.
Id.

16. Id. at 120, quoting Representative Utterback, the manager of
the bill in the House of Representatives.
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in commerce test if the seller's interstate profits are used to "underwrite" such sales.
The first interpretation was explicitly adopted in Willard
Dairy Corp. v. National Dairy Products Corp."7 Plaintiff in Willard was a local competitor of defendant in the wholesale milk
business in Ohio. Defendant engaged in discriminatory pricecutting between two areas in Ohio involving sales from a processing plant also located in Ohio. In sustaining dismissal of
plaintiff's action the court followed the "one interstate sale"
rule, holding that although defendant was engaged in interstate
commerce, it must also be established that the sale "complained
of" had occurred in interstate commerce.' 8 Moore was distinguished on the grounds that there the alleged discriminatory
purchases were made in interstate commerce and that interstate
sales of like grade and quality were discriminated against. 10 In
addition to adopting this restrictive interpretation of Moore, the
court noted that "[t] he fact that defendant also made interstate
shipments from other than its Shelby, Ohio, plant to areas in
which plaintiff did not engage in business is immaterial to the
issue in this case.' -0 It has been suggested that the court assumed that the discriminatory higher-priced sale in a primaryline case must not only occur in interstate commerce but must
also occur in plaintiff-seller's competitive area.-" It seems more
17. 309 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 934 (1963).
18. Id. at 946.
19. Id.
20. Id. (emphasis added.)
21. This interpretation of Willard has been advanced by several
commentators. See, e.g., F. RowE, PacE DISCRImINATION UNDEm THE
RoBiNsoN-PATMLAN AcT § 4.9, at 12 (1962, Supp. 1964); Comment, 9
N.Y.L.F. 93 (1963). Such an assumption on the part of the court, however, clearly runs counter to a recognized distinction between primaryline and secondary-line cases. The court in Willard, a primary-line
case, evidenced its confusion over this distinction by citing a secondaryline case in support of its statement-Davidson v. Kansas City Star
Co., 202 F. Supp. 613 (W.D. Mo. 1962). Davidson involved fixed, distinct
boundaries for paper routes such that newspaper carriers could not sell
outside their designated routes and thus did not compete with each
other. Plaintiff buyer in Davidson was a newspaper carrier who alleged
that defendant wholesaler discriminated in price between plaintiff and
other carriers who purchased papers from defendant. Dismissal of plaintiffs action was sustained because of the lack of competition between
plaintiff buyer and the other buyers. Thus, in secondary-line cases
discriminatory prices must occur in sales made to competing buyersotherwise no competitive injury would occur at the buyer level. But in
primary-line cases such as Willard involving competition between sellers, it is immaterial whether the buyers are competitors or not. It is
necessary only that the lower-priced of the two transactions occurs
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probable, however, that the court was referring simply to the
fact that here, as repeatedly emphasized in the opinion, the interstate sales outside of plaintiff-seller's area were not the ones
"complained of.' ' 22

Justice Black, in his dissent to the denial of certiorari in
Willard, stated that Willard was irreconcilable with Moore. He
felt the appellate court had misconstrued both Robinson-Patman
and Moore, reasoning that "allowing the economic resources and
staying power of an interstate company to be used with impunity to destroy local competition [is] precisely the sort of thing
the Robinson-Patman Act aimed to prevent."2 3 Despite such
criticism, Willard's interpretation of Moore was followed recently in Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc.,2 4 which sum-

marized the progress of the post-Moore case law:
Since [Moore], the critical language of 2(a) has been repeatedly construed to mean that the seller must not only be
engaged in interstate commerce, but that one of the discriminatory sales must be in commerce....
It seems safe to assume that if the post- [Moore] case law
is contrary to the language used there, the Supreme Court
would have corrected the misinterpretation on repeated appli-

cations for certiorari.

We take the statute to mean what it

says, i.e., that at least one of the discriminatory sales complained of must be in commerce.2 5

Littlejohn is the first case to fully apply the broad interpretation of Moore to primary-line discrimination.2 6

The alleged

in plaintiff seller's competitive area. See Atlas Building Products
Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 954-55 (10th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960).
22. This conclusion is prompted by an examination of the procedural context of the case. Plaintiff had failed to include an allegation of the interstate sales in its complaint, leading the court to stress
the requirement that "the sale complained of [be] one occurring in
interstate commerce." See note 18 supra, and accompanying text. Thus
the interstate sales were perhaps irrelevant, not because they occurred
outside of plaintiff-seller's competitive area, but because they were not
the sales complained of or alleged to be discriminatory in the complaint.
23. 373 U.S. at 935-36.
24. 383 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1967).
25. Id. at 787.
26. The court treated Littlejohn as a primary-line case, even
though plaintiff was actually in competition with defendants' buyers,
the retail service stations, rather than directly with defendants. The
trial court had intimated that plaintiff had no standing to sue because
defendants did not "control" the lower retail prices charged by their
stations to the public and because he could not, therefore, have been in
competition with defendants. The appellate court, however, did not
address itself to this issue. Perhaps the case may be best characterized as one involving indirect primary-line competition.
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discriminatory sales in Littlejohn were purely intrastate, even
though defendants were engaged in interstate commerce. Superficially at least, such facts do not satisfy the traditional "one interstate sale" rule as enunciated in Willard. Plaintiff also alleged, however, that defendants supported the intrastate pricecutting with profits derived from their interstate operations;
Littlejohn held this sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
Although this "underwriting" rule apparently has not been
acceptable to other circuits, it nevertheless may be viewed simply as an extension of the "one interstate sale" rule: if the interstate business of the defendant which underwrites the local
price-cutting consists of sales at a higher price of the same commodities as are involved in the price-cutting, then such sales may
satisfy the requirement of a discriminatory interstate sale.27
This argument is valid, however, only if the geographic location
of the higher-priced interstate sale is irrelevant.
There
would seem to be no significant reason to require that the
higher-priced sale be geographically proximate to the local
lower-priced sale in primary-line cases, since here the only sale
of immediate concern to the plaintiff-seller is the lower-priced
28
sale within his competitive area.
Furthermore, it is possible to read both Willard and Food
Basket consistently with this theory. Willard might be interpreted as implying that any higher-priced interstate sale, so long
as it is the sale complained of,2 9 meets the "one interstate sale"
rule regardless of the geographic location of the transaction's
source. This implication of a liberally conceived "one interstate
sale" rule is more explicit in Food Basket. Plaintiff in Food
Basket was an operator of an independent supermarket who attempted to show that defendant, an interstate supermarket
chain, cut prices in plaintiff's competitive area in Utah while
maintaining higher prices in Idaho. In sustaining summary
judgment against plaintiff on its Robinson-Patman claim, the
27. An allegation of "underwriting" may thus be construed as implying a discriminatory interstate sale; such an implication would be
sufficient to establish jurisdiction, thereby enabling plaintiff to survive
a motion either to dismiss or for summary judgment But see text
accompanying note 34 infra.
28. See notes 21 supraand 32 infra.
29. Willard repeatedly emphasized that the fatal defect in plaintiff's case was that the sale complained of had not occurred in interstate commerce. See note 22 supra. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to
raise an "underwriting" issue, which arguably would have implied a
discriminatory interstate sale. See note 27 supra, and accompanying
text.

1042

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1035

court pointed to plaintiff's failure "to show that any of the Idaho
sales were 'in commerce.' "30 Arguably the commodities sold in
Idaho need not have originated in Utah in order to satisfy the
rule; all that would have been necessary was one "interstate
leg," 31 no matter how unrelated geographically to the price-cutting in plaintiff's competitive area.
The traditional "one interstate sale" rule restrictively focuses on the respective locations of the two transactions involved in the alleged price discrimination. But only the predatory lower-priced sale within the plaintiff's own competitive
area affects his competitive position. With regard to the higherpriced sale, it is irrelevant to plaintiff whether that sale occurs
intrastate or interstate. 32 Therefore, the "one interstate sale"
rule appears to be simply a mechanical device to define the limits of section 2(a) jurisdiction in a manner completely unrelated
33
to the stated purposes of the Act.
On the other hand, the "underwriting" rule enunciated in
Littlejohn would seem to better promote the stated purposes of
the Robinson-Patman Act. Although the Act perhaps is premised on the faulty assumption that "interstate" business equals
"big" business, this rule properly focuses attention on the size
and nature of the discriminating seller rather than exclusively
on the purely mechanical question of whether one of the discriminatory sales crosses a state line. In accordance with the
goals of the Act, the interstate firm's ability to finance local
price warfare with funds derived from interstate operations
should serve as a basic criterion for invoking the Act's prohibitions.
Acceptance of the "underwriting" concept, however, will not
prove to be a general panacea with respect to Robinson-Patman
jurisdictional problems. First, the utilization of this concept
might in some cases create practically complex evidentiary
problems relating to the sufficiency of the interstate profits to
underwrite or offset the losses incurred in local price-cutting.
Second, the literal requirement in section 2(a) of interstate sales
30. 383 F.2d at 787.
31. Id. at 788.
32. In Moore, for example, the interstate character of the higherpriced sale, though sufficient for purposes of § 2(a) jurisdiction, had
no effect whatsoever on plaintiff's competitive position. Similarly, in
Willard and Food Basket any "interstate leg" would presumably have
been sufficient for jurisdictional purposes.
33. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
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of commodities of like grade and quality must still be met;3 4 that

is, the interstate profits used in the underwriting must be derived from such sales. Third, an interstate business could avoid
Littlejohn's "underwriting" rule by supporting local price-cutting
solely with profits derived from intrastate sales, albeit in several
states. Finally, the assumption that higher prices elsewhere always subsidize the lower price in plaintiff's competitive area
certainly is not valid. Such price disparities can, for example,
be wholly the product of diverse local competitive conditions
facing a seller with scattered operations.3"

34. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
35. Such local competitive conditions would constitute a valid
statutory defense. See note 2 supra.

